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Abstract
Street earnings are non-GAAP earnings, adjusted for consistency with the analyst ma-
jority basis and disseminated by forecast data providers (FDPs). We find that the
time it takes an FDP to incorporate street earnings in its products (activation delay,
hereafter) reflects variation in the difficulty of constructing street earnings, investor
demand for timely street earnings, and FDPs’ limited attention and resources. Fur-
thermore, the market reaction to reported earnings is more timely when activation
delay is shorter, and price discovery is highly concentrated during the hour after street
earnings are activated. Finally, activation delay increases the delay with which street
earnings are incorporated in analyst forecasts. We conclude that frictions in infor-
mation processing prevent market participants from instantaneously constructing and
incorporating street earnings in their decisions, and that FDPs play a key role in alle-
viating these frictions.
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1 Introduction
Street earnings are non-GAAP earnings, adjusted for consistency with analysts’ con-
sensus forecast basis and distributed by forecast data providers (FDPs, henceforth). A vast
literature examines their properties and capital market consequences and concludes that,
on average, street earnings inform rather than mislead investors.1 While some studies ac-
knowledge the involvement of FDPs in non-GAAP reporting (Lambert, 2004; Abarbanell
and Lehavy, 2007; Black et al., 2017), the role of FDPs in constructing and distributing
street earnings in capital markets is largely unexamined.
Absent frictions in information processing in capital markets, the role of FDPs merits
little attention as street earnings are instantaneously constructed, disseminated, and im-
pounded in prices. In fully efficient markets, while some investors may face frictions and find
it cost effective to rely on FDPs for street earnings information, market prices are set by
investors who do not face any frictions. In contrast, our thesis is that information frictions
prevent street earnings information from being instantaneously produced and acted upon in
capital markets, and that FDPs play a key role in alleviating these frictions.
Firms disclose quarterly earnings through numerous channels: newswires, regulatory
filings, corporate web sites, and social media (Blankespoor et al., 2014). We argue that
monitoring all these channels to obtain reported earnings, adjusting reported earnings for
consistency with analysts’ forecasting basis, and maintaining a dataset of street earnings
actuals are costly activities that are most efficiently performed by FDPs rather than other
intermediaries or investors for at least two reasons. First, these tasks are similar to FDPs’
tasks of ensuring that a common forecasting basis underlies the consensus earnings forecast
and maintaining a database of earnings forecasts. Second, the value of earnings forecasts is
likely enhanced when paired up with street earnings actuals, since both measures are needed
to calculate unexpected corporate performance. As such, FDPs have strong incentives to
quickly determine and disseminate street earnings actuals.
1See Black et al. (2017) for a comprehensive survey of the non-GAAP reporting literature.
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Our empirical investigation of the process by which street earnings are produced and
revealed in capital markets is guided by two basic questions: (1) What determines the delay
with which FDPs report street earnings? (2) To what extent do investors and analysts rely
on FDPs to determine street earnings? To answer these questions, we use Thomson Reuters’
(TR) Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) because TR is a major provider
of street earnings, and because we can identify the precise time when a street earnings
actual has been made available for distribution to I/B/E/S subscribers (i.e., activation time).
We measure street earnings activation delay as the time (in minutes) between an earnings
announcement and the activation of the EPS actual in the I/B/E/S database.
Analyzing a sample of 67,908 quarterly earnings announcements made between 2006
and 2015 for which we can obtain precise press release timestamps, we document that the
mean (median) street earnings activation delay is 594 (44) minutes. Delay is increasing in
task difficulty as captured by the number of items commonly excluded from GAAP earnings
to construct street earnings, as well as the absolute value of the difference between GAAP
and street earnings. These effects are economically large as a one standard deviation increase
in either of the measures corresponds to an incremental delay of around 46 minutes. Further-
more, activation delay is decreasing in the extent of management’s non-GAAP discussion in
the press release, as well as management’s EPS guidance, suggesting that these disclosures
simplify FDPs’ task of constructing street earnings.
We also examine how TR processes announced but unactivated earnings, a direct mea-
sure of TR’s work backlog. Building on prior research examining investors’ processing of
competing earnings announcements (Hirshleifer et al., 2009; Frederickson and Zolotoy, 2016),
we analyze whether TR queues street earnings activations based on firm visibility. Consis-
tent with TR prioritizing street earnings activations of firms that are more visible, we find
that a one standard deviation increase in TR’s work backlog increases the street earnings
activation delay by 171 (104) minutes when firm visibility is one standard deviation below
(above) the sample mean.
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To address the question of whether investors rely on TR for street earnings informa-
tion, we adopt a difference-in-difference (DID) approach which exploits an exogenous change
in TR’s processing of earnings. Specifically, prior to September 2009, earnings actuals of
companies reporting unexpected charges or gains were temporarily “held out” from TR
products to see if the majority basis would change going forward. After September 2009,
this practice was completely eliminated, significantly increasing the timeliness of street earn-
ings activations for affected firms.2 To the extent that the market relies on TR for street
earnings information, we expect to observe a greater increase in market reaction timeliness
after September 2009 for companies that report unexpected charges or gains (the treated
sample) relative to those that do not (the control sample).
We define market reaction timeliness as the speed with which prices adjust to earnings
information in the [0, 5] trading-day window following the earnings announcement (e.g.,
Butler et al., 2007; Bushman et al., 2010; Twedt, 2016; Lyle et al., 2017; Drake et al., 2017).
We calculate the buy-and-hold abnormal return of each day in the [0, 5] window, scaled
by the buy-and-hold abnormal return over the entire six-day window after the earnings
announcement, and use the area under the curve formed by this series of ratios as an estimate
of market reaction timeliness. Consistent with investors relying on TR for street earnings
information, we document a significant increase in average market reaction timeliness in the
treated sample relative to the control sample. We perform multiple placebo tests, where we
randomly manipulate assignment to the treatment and control samples as well as the timing
of the methodology change, and find that our results are specific to the methodology change.
We acknowledge that TR’s 2009 methodology change may coincide with unobservable
changes in investors’ independent processing of earnings, and that the dramatic increase in
the timeliness of TR’s processing - from an average delay of 1,438 minutes in the pre-2009
period to around 120 minutes in the post-2009 period - raises questions about investors’
reliance on TR in recent years. To alleviate these concerns, we perform intra-day price dis-
2Section 4.1 provides more details on the 2009 TR methodology change.
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covery tests in the post-2009 period. Similar to Dong et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015), and
Akbas et al. (2018), we divide the two-day announcement window centered on the earnings
press release into 15-minute intervals and regress the portion of the announcement-window
return concentrated in a given 15-minute interval on lead and lag activation indicators. We
find robust evidence of incremental increases in price discovery during the 15-minute window
subsequent to TR street earnings activation, as well as a relative increase in price discovery
during the hour immediately following activation compared with the preceding hour, con-
sistent with investors continuing to rely on TR to process street earnings information in the
post-2009 period.3
Finally, we test whether TR’s street earnings activation delay leads to additional ana-
lyst forecasting delays following earnings announcements.4 Although analysts independently
analyze earnings announcements and conference calls to determine their own earnings sur-
prise, they likely rely on TR to determine the consensus earnings surprise, both useful in
assessing quarterly performance and forming expectations of next quarter performance.5 To
establish causality, we instrument TR’s delay in activating firm i ’s earnings with the number
of firms that are in TR’s work backlog but are not covered by the analyst, motivated by the
idea that an analyst is only “distracted” by firms in her coverage universe. As expected, we
find that TR’s activation delay leads to forecasting delay. Specifically, a one standard devi-
ation increase in instrumented activation delay leads to an incremental average forecasting
delay of approximately 5.4 hours.
Our study extends the literature on street earnings in several ways. Conceptually, we
offer a simple framework that emphasizes the role of information frictions in the production
3In the Internet Appendix, we demonstrate that our model of activation delay has investment value.
Specifically, we find that sorting on expected activation delay (based on Eq.(1)) improves the profitability of
a trading strategy that buys (sells) stocks with positive (negative) earnings news within 15 minutes of the
announcement, giving more credence to the hypothesis that the market relies on TR.
4Investors value timely post-announcement analyst forecast and recommendation revisions (Stickel, 1989;
Zhang, 2008; Yezegel, 2015), giving analysts strong incentives for quick information processing and dissemi-
nation (Cooper et al., 2001).
5Figure 6 provides examples of analyst reports that discuss TR’s consensus surprise alongside analyst’s
own surprise.
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and distribution of street earnings in capital markets, and makes explicit the role of forecast
data providers in alleviating these frictions. Our framework offers new insights about the
delay with which street earnings are constructed, disseminated, and subsequently impounded
in market prices and analyst forecasts.
Empirically, we offer new evidence that is helpful in explaining the process by which
street earnings are produced and revealed in capital markets. Specifically, we find that ana-
lysts and investors incorporate street earnings information with a delay, and that this delay
is related to the delay with which TR disseminates I/B/E/S street earnings. Our study of
the role of TR in processing street earnings complements and extends Akbas et al.’s (2018)
study of the role of TR in processing analyst forecasts in several ways. First, processing
earnings disclosures presents unique challenges, which we capture by including several mea-
sures of earnings and press release complexity. Second, earnings announcements are arguably
the most important information events for valuation purposes in capital markets, giving TR
strong incentives for quick processing. With average street earnings activation delay being
approximately a third of forecast activation delay, Akbas et al.’s (2018) results may not ex-
trapolate to our setting. Finally, we use novel identification strategies specific to our setting
to establish a causal relation between street earnings activation delay and the delay with
which investors and analysts respond to earnings news, critical to establishing the role of
FDPs in the earnings information supply chain.
More broadly, our study also extends prior literature examining the role of various
information intermediaries in the earnings disclosure process: equity analysts (Zhang, 2008),
the press (e.g., Bushee et al., 2010), social media (e.g., Blankespoor et al., 2014), newswires
(e.g., Boulland et al., 2017), and news alert services (e.g., Li et al., 2011). Our study focuses
on an intermediary that performs a distinct task - the construction and the distribution of
street earnings - on behalf of investors and other intermediaries.
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2 Background and Institutional Setting
2.1 Street Earnings and the Role of FDPs in Prior Literature
Beginning with Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968), numerous studies document
the value relevance of earnings, and recent evidence shows that the information content of
earnings announcements has increased dramatically since 2001 (Beaver et al., 2017, 2018).
To measure the news content of an earnings announcement, financial experts generally use
the consensus error, calculated as the difference between realized earnings and the consensus
analyst forecast (Chiang et al., 2018). While all public companies must report their earnings
in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the consensus error
is typically calculated using non-GAAP “street” earnings. Street earnings may include or
exclude transitory earnings components (e.g., discontinued operations, extraordinary items,
nonrecurring items, restructuring costs, etc.), depending on how the majority of contributing
analysts value the company.6
Managers, analysts, and FDPs have wide discretion in determining which earnings
components to include/exclude in street earnings calculations. As a result, a number of
prior studies have examined managers’ and analysts’ non-GAAP discretion and reporting
incentives (e.g., Christensen et al., 2011; Barth et al., 2012; Doyle et al., 2013; Bentley
et al., 2018). In addition, there is a large literature analyzing market reactions to GAAP
and non-GAAP earnings surprises (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Brown and Sivakumar,
2003; Bhattacharya et al., 2007). These studies generally find that investors respond more
strongly to non-GAAP than to GAAP earnings.
Forecast data providers such as I/B/E/S construct and disseminate street earnings to
the public. Although some prior studies acknowledge the role of FDPs in determining street
earnings (Lambert, 2004; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2007; Black et al., 2017), to our knowledge,
6Instances of voluntary management disclosures of non-GAAP earnings as well as analysts’ adjustments
of GAAP earnings have increased in recent years (Bentley et al., 2018).
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the explicit role of FDPs in the earnings disclosure process remains largely unexamined.7,8
Moreover, prior literature focuses on explaining the non-GAAP adjustments made to arrive
at FDP-reported street earnings, assuming that all market participants determine street
earnings instantaneously. In this study, we contribute to the existing non-GAAP literature
by explicitly analyzing the role of FDPs in the street earnings reporting process.
2.2 Institutional Facts about FDPs’ Role in Street Earnings Re-
porting
To shed light on the role of FDPs in processing and disseminating street earnings,
our study examines the time it takes to construct street earnings from the earnings press
release. We focus on a single representative FDP, TR’s I/B/E/S database, as I/B/E/S is
the most commonly used data source for both street earnings and analyst-based earnings
surprise in prior literature.9 TR obtains street earnings information by employing market
specialists to monitor a variety of earnings reporting sources, including newswire feeds, press
releases, company websites, and public filings. TR’s methodology document states that
market specialists review earnings reports to determine the amount that corresponds to the
analyst majority basis at the time of reporting (Thomson Reuters, 2009). Christensen (2007)
summarizes the process by which TR adjudicates between managers’ non-GAAP earnings
disclosures and analysts’ consensus forecasts as follows:
When the press release contains an adjusted earnings number, [TR checks] to see
if it is the same as the number they plan to report as their “I/B/E/S actual”
number based on forecasts. To the extent that (a) there is extreme disagreement
7Abarbanell and Lehavy (2007) refer to FDP street earnings numbers as a “black box” that cannot be
traced back to a single manager or analyst produced data source, and Bradshaw and Soliman (2007, p. 736)
state that there is “no compelling evidence in the literature that identifies FDP earnings as a predominantly
analyst-driven, manager-driven, or forecast data provider-driven phenomenon.”
8Schaub (2018) examines the dissemination of street earnings from 1995 to 2011 by a defunct FDP,
First Call, and finds that day-late (next day or later) activations are associated with weaker announcement
returns and stronger post earnings announcement drift (PEAD). However, the study does not discuss research
questions related to the determinants of street earnings activation delay. In contrast, we study determinants
and consequences of dissemination of street earnings by I/B/E/S from 2006 to 2015. Given that day-late
activations account for only 2% of all activations after the 2009 change in I/B/E/S methodology, and that
we find no evidence of PEAD in our sample, results of Schaub (2018) fall short of providing insights into the
role of FDPs in today’s markedly different environment.
9Thomson Reuters’ marketing materials also claim that I/B/E/S data has “a 70:1 advantage of media
citations, relied upon by over 70% of the top US and European asset managers.”
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among analysts in what they were forecasting or (b) the earnings number adjusted
for transitory items not forecasted by analysts disagrees with an adjusted number
reported by managers in the press release, I/B/E/S delays reporting the I/B/E/S
actual EPS number until it is able to go back and carefully examine the reason
for the difference in adjustments. In these situations, it is possible for I/B/E/S
to decide ex post whether or not to go along with what managers report in their
press releases (Christensen, 2007, p. 744).
Consequently, TR market specialists devote significant resources processing companies’ earn-
ings press releases, and some releases take longer to process than others.
One major benefit of examining TR’s I/B/E/S as a representative FDP is that we
are able to observe the time it takes TR to process the street earnings actual. When the
street earnings verification process ends, TR activates the actual by distributing it across
client data platforms. Accordingly, we measure I/B/E/S street earnings activation delay
(Activation Delay) as the time, in minutes, between the press release timestamp and the
activation timestamp in I/B/E/S. Upon activation, I/B/E/S street earnings actuals are
included in database calculations, such as earnings surprise metrics, and then disseminated
via various TR product platforms.10 Following Akbas et al. (2018), we view the activation
time as a proxy for I/B/E/S dissemination time.
2.3 Research Questions
Our thesis is that information frictions prevent street earnings information from being
instantaneously produced and impounded into stock prices, and that FDPs play a key role
in alleviating these frictions. In this regard, our study extends prior research documenting
delays in investors’ response to earnings news due to their limited processing capacity or
inattention (e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2009; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Frederickson and
Zolotoy, 2016). Under this view, we conjecture that the time required by FDPs to construct
the street earnings actual is a function of the temporary and recurring items included in
10Subscribers to some I/B/E/S products, such as I/B/E/S Real Time, receive data packets extremely close
to the time of activation. Subscribers to other quantitative data products, such as I/B/E/S QFS, receive
less timely periodic batch data updates throughout the day. I/B/E/S data are also disseminated through
other Thomson Reuters platforms, such as Datastream and TR’s flagship desktop product, Eikon, as well as
through third-party providers such as Yahoo! Finance. In some cases, data updates for these downstream
products occur less frequently, at daily, weekly, or monthly intervals.
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GAAP earnings, as well as the manner in which these items are disclosed in earnings press
releases.
Given that prior literature finds that street earnings are value relevant, we argue that
market participants, such as investors and analysts, have an interest in obtaining street
earnings information. As a result, the timeliness of their response to earnings news could
vary with street earnings processing time. Further, if processing of street earnings is more
efficiently performed by FDPs than other intermediaries or investors themselves, investors
and analysts may rely directly on FDPs for street earnings information.
Figure 1 places the timing of FDPs’ processing in the context of the overall earnings
disclosure process observed in our sample. The mean (median) earnings press release in our
sample is disseminated 33 (31) days after the end of the fiscal period. Companies file an 8-K
containing the press release within 353 (34) minutes of newswire dissemination. Similarly, TR
activates street earnings in I/B/E/S within 594 (44) minutes of press release dissemination.
For companies providing conference calls, the mean (median) call occurs within 323 (121)
minutes of press release dissemination, such that street earnings activation may occur either
before or after the earnings conference call. Financial analysts then incorporate information
from the current realization of quarterly street earnings and the conference call to revise
their EPS forecasts within 1549 (1235) minutes, or about 26 (20) hrs, from press release
dissemination. Overall, this descriptive evidence is consistent with FDPs potentially serving
as important information intermediaries for other market participants.
3 What Determines Street Earnings Activation Delay?
3.1 Model Development
In this section, we introduce the determinants of TR’s street earnings processing delay.
In Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, we argue that the time required by TR to construct the street
earnings actual is a function of earnings and press release complexity. In Sections 3.1.3 and
3.1.4, we hypothesize that TR’s processing delay varies with investors’ demand for timely
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information and TR’s limited supply of attention and resources. Finally, in Section 3.1.5, we
discuss the impact of TR’s 2009 methodology change on its processing of reported earnings.
3.1.1 Earnings Processing Complexity
In order to adjust reported GAAP earnings to the same basis as analysts’ forecasts,
TR must determine relevant non-GAAP exclusions and their magnitudes. Accordingly, we
conjecture that TR street earnings processing delay is increasing in the number of potential
non-GAAP exclusions necessary to convert GAAP earnings to street earnings (Potential
Exclusions), as well as the overall magnitude of the GAAP-to-street adjustments made by
TR (Abs(GAAP-Street Diff)).
Earnings that deviate strongly from expectations are also more likely to require addi-
tional verification by TR specialists. Therefore, we predict that street earnings processing
delay increases with the absolute value of the earnings surprise, Abs(Surprise). In addition,
as negative earnings surprises can have costly market consequences (Skinner and Sloan,
2002), we examine whether TR spends additional time verifying earnings of firms with neg-
ative surprises (Bad News). Moreover, prior literature finds that the timing of quarterly
earnings announcements relative to firms’ fiscal calendar ends, Reporting Lag, predicts the
likelihood that announcements will contain negative news or complex items (e.g., Kross and
Schroeder, 1984; Bagnoli et al., 2002; Johnson and So, 2017). If TR spends additional time
on earnings press releases of late reporting firms, we expect a positive association between
Reporting Lag and street earnings activation delay.
Fourth quarter results are more likely to contain special items (Burgstahler et al.,
2002) and earnings revisions that are identified during external audits or year-end closing
procedures (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; Hollie et al., 2012; Haislip et al., 2017). As a
result, street earnings activation delay may be longer for fourth quarter earnings (QTR4 )
relative to other quarters. Lastly, analysts’ forecasting basis is more likely to conform with
management’s reporting basis for firms that provide earnings guidance (Doyle et al., 2013;
Akbas et al., 2018). As such, we predict a negative association between EPS Guidance and
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TR activation delay.
3.1.2 Press Release Complexity
The earnings press release is arguably one of the most important sources of information
at the time of the earnings announcement. Prior literature documents that press releases
include information about quarter-end earnings and its components (e.g., discontinued op-
erations, extraordinary items, etc.) as well as management discussion of firm performance
(Hoskin et al., 1986). Moreover, press releases have increased significantly in length and
informativeness over time (Francis et al., 2002; Collins et al., 2009; Davis et al., 2012).
Accordingly, we construct text-based measures of press release complexity that are likely
associated with the processing time required to construct street earnings.11
When constructing street earnings, TR specialists use press releases to extract relevant
pieces of information. If press release length increases the complexity of this task, we expect
longer activation delays for firms with lengthier press releases. We use the number of words
in the press release, (Total Words), to measure the length of the press release.
Bentley et al. (2018) use the text of earnings press releases to identify the presence of
managers’ non-GAAP EPS disclosures, and analyze the extent of managements’ discussion
of non-GAAP adjustments. From TR’s perspective, more extensive non-GAAP discussion
provided in the press release may reduce the complexity of identifying the categories and
magnitudes of non-GAAP exclusions, resulting in shorter activation delay. Alternatively,
more references to non-GAAP exclusions could be indicative of a longer list of exclusions
and therefore more work for TR specialists. Thus, we explore the effect of management’s
non-GAAP discussion on street earnings activation delay by including Non-GAAP Words,
constructed as in Bentley et al. (2018).
Text that contains numbers is more verifiable and precise than general descriptions of
topics (Dyer et al., 2017). To the extent that narrative disclosure in earnings press releases
11TR’s market specialists source street earnings actuals from newswire feeds, press releases, company
websites, and public filings. We contend that the underlying press release content varies little, if at all, across
dissemination channels. Therefore, to test predictions related to disclosure complexity, we use earnings press
releases available on Form 8-K at the SEC’s EDGAR system.
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is supported by quantitative data, TR’s task should be more straightforward. However, a
larger mix of quantitative data relative to narrative disclosure (i.e., hard vs. soft information)
could also point to the presence of a larger number of line items or non-GAAP exclusions
that TR specialists have to examine. Accordingly, we also explore the effect of press release
quantitative density by including HardInfoMix, the ratio of informative numbers to the total
number of words in the press release (Dyer et al., 2017), as a determinant of street earnings
activation delay.
Finally, we hypothesize that TR’s processing delay may increase with the amount of
operations- and strategy-related disclosures. These disclosures could be indicative of more
complex underlying business operations that require more extensive non-GAAP adjustments
to construct street earnings. To test this prediction, we include the number of operations-
and strategy-related words (Dyer et al., 2017), Operations, as a determinant of street earnings
activation delay.
3.1.3 Investor Demand for Timely Processing of Actual Earnings
TR caters to investors’ demand for timely data processing (Akbas et al., 2018). Ac-
cordingly, we predict that street earnings activation delay decreases with investors’ demand
for timely street earnings information. Prior literature finds that investor demand for infor-
mation is higher among firms with greater investor visibility (e.g., Frederickson and Zolotoy,
2016). Thus, we use multiple aspects of firm visibilty, including Market Value, Advertising
Expense, Media Coverage, Analyst Following, Institutional Ownership, Firm Age, and S&P
500 membership, as measures of investor demand. As these variables are highly correlated
with each other and capture similar aspects of firm visibility, we employ principal component
analysis to mitigate the multicollinearity problem. This procedure yields two factors with
Market Value, Advertising Expense, and Media Coverage loading on one factor and Analyst
Following, Institutional Ownership, Firm Age and S&P 500 loading on the other. Since
firms with higher market capitalization, advertising expense, and media coverage are more
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visible to the general public, we label the first factor General Visibility. Analyst following,
institutional ownership, firm age, and S&P 500 membership, however, likely capture firm vis-
ibility among institutional investors and, therefore, we label the second factor Inst. Investor
Visibility.
3.1.4 Thomson Reuters’ Limited Attention and Resources
Following Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and Akbas et al. (2018), we predict that FDPs are
slower in processing earnings news when they face a larger backlog of unprocessed earnings
announcements. We use the number of unactivated actuals (Unactivated Actuals) to measure
TR’s backlog around earnings announcements. Further, Berkman and Truong (2009) find
that roughly 47% of the earnings announcements from January 2000 to December 2004 were
made after hours, with the percentage of after-hours reporting increasing from 42% in 2000
to 49% in 2004. We observe a similar pattern in our data and predict that TR likely faces
a large information load after the market closes (After Market Close), which should levy an
additional toll on activation delay. Alternatively, given that firms often schedule the after-
hours timing of their earnings announcements well in advance (Bagnoli et al., 2002), TR
could shift its resources to times during which earnings announcements are more likely to
occur. Finally, prior literature predicts that market participants are inattentive on Fridays
(e.g., DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Michaely et al., 2016). Accordingly, we predict longer
delays for Friday announcements.
3.1.5 I/B/E/S Methodology Change
In September 2009, TR changed its methodology for collecting and distributing street
earnings actuals to provide increased data timeliness. Previously, when a company reported
results, actuals of companies that reported unexpected charges or gains were temporarily
“held out” from TR products to see if the majority basis would change going forward. This
TR practice resulted in longer street earnings processing times. After September 2009, this
“held out” period was completely eliminated and now TR reports all earnings actuals based
13
on the analysts’ majority basis at the time of the earnings report, significantly increasing
timeliness of actuals for companies with unexpected charges or gains (Thomson Reuters,
2009).12
Given these significant changes in TR’s methodology for processing unexpected items,
we predict that announcements containing an item that is likely to be classified as “unex-
pected” (Unexpected Item) will exhibit longer activation delays prior to September 30, 2009,
and that this incremental delay will be reduced after the methodology change.13 Accord-
ingly, we include both Unexpected Item and its interaction with Post, an indicator equal to
one for announcements after September 30, 2009, and zero otherwise. We expect to observe
a positive coefficient on Unexpected Item, capturing incremental delays associated with the
“held out” practice prior to the methodology change, and a negative coefficient on the in-
teraction term capturing the decrease in activation delay associated with the methodology
change.
3.2 Data
Table 1 describes our sample selection procedure. Our analyses require precise times-
tamps of earnings press releases. Therefore, our sample starts in 2006, the first year of Wall
Street Horizon (WSH) timestamp data availability. We start with all quarterly street earn-
ings actuals in I/B/E/S for firms whose stock is listed on NYSE, NYSE MKT, NASDAQ,
12Since September 2009, TR reviews analysts’ reaction to unexpected line items after disseminating an
initial actual based on the estimates majority basis at the time of the report. If analysts’ go-forward
majority basis changes after the fact, TR updates the actual and corresponding surprise values accordingly,
and footnotes the reason. Activation timestamps are not revised and always reflect the initial data activation.
While the 2009 methodology change improved the timeliness of initial street earnings activations, it likely
lowered their reliability. To estimate changes in the reliability of actuals, we use TR’s I/B/E/S “go-forward
actuals” file (available starting in 2013) and find that reduced reliability of actuals is a relatively minor
concern as only around 4% of announcements experience a go-forward basis change (untabulated).
13Our data do not identify which announcements contain line items deemed “unexpected” by TR special-
ists. Thus, we use the list of examples discussed in TR’s methodology guide to identify line items likely
to be classified as unexpected (see Thomson Reuters, 2009). Specifically, we define Unexpected Item as an
indicator variable that equals one if a company reports any of the following eight unexpected charges/gains:
a large restructuring charge, a large acquisition expense or gain, net credit or charge to reserves for bad
debts from loan recoveries or charge-offs, nonrecurring income taxes, settlement of litigation or insurance,
asset write-down, goodwill impairment, and large special items. An item is classified as large if it is in the
top decile of the sample distribution of its absolute value.
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or NYSE ARCA with a price greater than $1 as of trading day t− 2 relative to the I/B/E/S
actual announcement date.
I/B/E/S provides two timestamps, the announcement time (ANNTIMS), which rep-
resents the time at which TR receives the relevant source data, and the activation time
(ACTTIMS), which represents the time at which the estimate was activated in the I/B/E/S
database. Bradley et al. (2014) find that I/B/E/S announcement timestamps are sometimes
delayed from press release timestamps. Accordingly, to measure street earnings activation
delay, we match each I/B/E/S actual with a corresponding press release timestamp from
WSH, requiring the WSH press release date to be within five calendar days of the I/B/E/S
announcement date. To further validate the WSH data, we require all observations to have
an earnings press release available in Ravenpack for the same date as the WSH timestamp.
In cases where intraday timestamps differ between the two data sources, we choose the earlier
of the WSH and Ravenpack timestamps. For approximately 72.77% of earnings actuals in
our sample, the I/B/E/S announcement timestamp is equal to the press release timestamp.
For the remainder of observations in our sample, the I/B/E/S announcement timestamp is
delayed by a mean (median) of 61.56 (26) minutes, indicating a delay in the time at which
TR was able to obtain source data for some earnings reports.
We also require each observation in our sample to be matched to a Form 8-K from
EDGAR containing the text of the earnings press release. Finally, we merge our sample with
other databases required to collect variables in Eq.(1) (e.g., Compustat, CRSP). Appendix
A.1 includes all variable definitions and data sources. Our main sample includes 67,908
quarterly earnings announcements made by 4,367 unique firms between January 2006 and
December 2015. We delete observations with Activation Delay equal to zero or longer than
10 calendar days to control for likely I/B/E/S data errors (Bradley et al., 2014; Akbas et al.,
2018). All other continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics for variables in Eq. (1). The mean (median) Ac-
tivation Delay is 594 (44) minutes and varies between 6 minutes at the 5th percentile and
4,288 minutes at the 95th percentile. An average firm has a market value of $4.56 billion,
spends around $33 million a year on advertising, and is covered in an average of 51 news
stories over the one month before its earnings announcement. Further, an average firm has
an institutional ownership of 68.49% and is covered by 11 analysts.
The mean (median) Potential Exclusions is 2.65 (2), while the difference between
GAAP and I/B/E/S earnings per share, captured by Abs(GAAP-Street Diff), has a mean
(median) of 59% (2%). Around 33% of announcements in the sample are Bad News, and
around 11% have EPS Guidance. It takes on average 33 days to issue the press release after
the fiscal period end.
Earnings press releases filed with the SEC have a mean (median) of 3,629 (2,859)
words. In our sample around 89.2% (untabulated) of 8-K press releases contain non-GAAP
trigger words, however, the ratio of non-GAAP words to total words in the press release is
small, with a mean (median) of 0.68% (0.50%). An average press release contains 4.65%
of quantitative data (HardInfoMix ), while business operations and strategy disclosures (Op-
erations) account for an average of 6.98% of total words. Further, the average number of
announced but unactivated EPS actuals is 153, indicating TR’s average workload at the
time of the earnings announcement. Unexpected Item and Post have means of 0.37 and 0.64,
respectively, indicating that 37% of announcements contain an item likely to be classified as
“unexpected” and 64% of announcements in our sample occur after the 2009 methodology
change.
Figure 2 illustrates the distributions of press release and street earnings activation
times throughout the day. Similar to prior studies (e.g., deHaan et al., 2015; Michaely
et al., 2016; Lyle et al., 2017), the majority of earnings press releases in our sample fall
within two clusters: a pre-market cluster around 7–8AM and an after-market cluster at
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4PM. While remaining bi-modal, the distribution of street earnings activation times is more
widely dispersed, with the mass of pre-market activations trailing into regular trading hours,
and the spike in activations after market close trailing later into the evening.
3.4 Multivariate Results
To test whether and how TR’s street earnings activation delay is associated with various
firm characteristics, we estimate the following panel regression:
Ln(Activation delay)i,t = β1 × Earnings Processing Complexityi,t
+ β2 × Press Release Complexityi,t
+ β3 ×Demand for T imely Processingi,t
+ β4 × Limited Attention / Resourcesi,t
+ β5 × I/B/E/S Methodology Changei,t + YearQtrFE + i,t, (1)
where Ln(Activation delay) is the natural logarithm of Activation Delay for firm i’s earn-
ings announcement on day t. Earnings Processing Complexity, Press Release Complexity, De-
mand for Timely Processing, Limited Attention/Resources, and I/B/E/S Methodology Change
are vectors with predictor variables identified in Sections 3.1.1 - 3.1.5. YearQtrFE is a vector
of year-quarter fixed effects.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results of estimating Eq. (1). Column (1) reports the
estimated coefficients, while Column (2) reports the marginal effects for each determinant
category. We standardize all continuous variables to have a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one to facilitate interpretation. We find that all measures of earnings process-
ing complexity, except QTR4, are statistically significant in the predicted directions. The
coefficient on Potential Exclusions is 0.073 (t-stat=4.13), which implies that a one standard
deviation increase in Potential Exclusions is associated with a 7.57% increase (45 minutes)
in Activation Delay.14 Further, a one standard deviation increase in Abs(GAAP-Street Diff)
(coef. = 0.074, t-stat=6.75) is associated with an increase of around 46 minutes in Acti-
vation Delay. These results suggest that converting GAAP earnings to street earnings is a
14We calculate the marginal effects from our determinants model relative to the mean sample value of
Activation Delay, which is equal to 594 minutes.
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non-trivial task requiring a significant amount of FDP processing time. Other proxies for
earnings processing complexity also have large effects on street earnings activation delay.
Notably, when earnings news is negative, Activation Delay increases by an additional 75
minutes, while management EPS guidance reduces Activation Delay by 45 minutes. Overall,
these results suggest that earnings processing complexity leads to substantial delays in street
earnings processing.
Next, we find that press release disclosure complexity is incremental to the underlying
earnings complexity in determining street earnings activation delay. In particular, the coef-
ficient on Ln(Total Words) is 0.085 (t-stat=7.53), suggesting that a one standard deviation
increase in Ln(Total Words) is associated with around 53 minutes increase in Activation
Delay. Non-GAAP Words has a negative coefficient of -0.063 (t-stat=-4.05), consistent with
non-GAAP disclosures reducing the time it takes TR to identify individual exclusions and
their magnitudes. Finally, we find that lengthier discussions of firm operations and strate-
gies increase the activation delay as evidenced by the large positive coefficient on Operations
(coef. = 0.071, t-stat=5.75). Collectively, our results suggest that press release complexity
has an economically meaningful impact on FDPs’ street earnings processing time.
General Visibility and Institutional Investor Visibility, our two proxies for investors’
demand for timely information, both have significantly negative coefficients, consistent with
FDPs prioritizing more visible firms when processing earnings. Among proxies for FDP
limited attention/resources, Ln(Unactivated Actuals) has a significantly positive coefficient,
suggesting that an increase in the backlog of earnings announcements results in additional
processing delay. In contrast to deHaan et al. (2015), who find evidence of lower media, ana-
lyst, and investor attention to earnings news released after hours, we find a highly significant
negative coefficient on After Market Close, implying that, on average, announcements at 4:00
PM or after are processed by TR about 146 minutes faster than earnings announcements
occurring earlier in the day. In untabulated tests, we find that this result is mainly driven by
announcements occurring from 4:00PM-5:00PM. As 4:00PM-5:00PM is the most common
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time for scheduled press releases in our sample, we interpret this result as TR rationally
shifting resources to accommodate the predictable 4:00-5:00PM workload.
Finally, we find that, prior to the 2009 methodology change, Unexpected Item firms have
on average 333 minutes longer Activation Delay than non-Unexpected Item firms, consistent
with TR’s “held out” period practice leading to significant incremental delays. However,
the marginal effect of -393 minutes for Post × Unexpected Item suggests that this incremen-
tal delay is eliminated following TR’s 2009 methodology change. Collectively, our results
indicate that activating street earnings is a non-trivial process which varies with earnings
and press release complexity as well as with investors’ demand for information and FDPs’
resources to process information.
3.5 FDP Queueing Behavior around Earnings Announcements
The results from Table 3, Panel A indicate that FDPs are slower in processing earnings
news when there is a larger backlog of unprocessed earnings announcements. Frederickson
and Zolotoy (2016) find that, when faced with the task of processing competing earnings
announcements on the same day, investors queue announcements based on firm visibility.
They indirectly infer investors’ processing behavior from patterns in post-announcement
market returns. In contrast, our research setting allows us to directly test FDPs’ processing
of competing earnings news. Specifically, we are able to observe both the FDP’s queue
of announced but yet-to-be-processed earnings (Ln(Unactivated Actuals)) and the speed
with which the FDP processes a given announcement (Activation Delay). Further, while
Frederickson and Zolotoy (2016) argue that their results are driven by less sophisticated
investors, our results from estimating Eq. (1) are consistent with sophisticated information
processors (i.e., FDPs) also having limited attention and earnings processing capabilities.
Thus, visibility-based queuing in the presence of competing earnings announcements may be
a general phenomenon pertaining to various market participants.
In Panel B of Table 3, we test whether the effect of Ln(Unactivated Actuals) on Activa-
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tion Delay varies with firm visibility. We predict that the effect of Ln(Unactivated Actuals)
on Activation Delay is weaker (stronger) for more (less) visible firms. Columns (1)-(3) of Ta-
ble 3, Panel B, report the estimated coefficients from our analyses. As predicted, in Columns
(1) and (2), we find significant negative coefficients for each individual interaction term. In
Column (3) where both interaction terms are included, we find evidence of FDP queuing
only based on Inst. Investor Visibility and not on General Visibility, consistent with FDPs
catering to institutional investor demand for speedy processing. The coefficients of 0.207 on
Ln(Unactivated Actuals) (t-stat=6.19) and -0.046 on Ln(Unactivated Actuals)×Inst. Investor
Visibility (t-statistic -3.07) in Column (3) imply that a one standard deviation increase in
Ln(Unactivated Actuals) increases activation delay by 171 (104) minutes for firms that are
one standard deviation below (above) the mean level of Inst. Investor Visibility.
4 Do Investors Rely on I/B/E/S for Street Earnings Informa-
tion?
Consistent with our proposed framework, the results in Section 3 indicate that FDPs
face processing costs that delay street earnings activation. However, it is unclear whether this
delay has consequences for the market reaction to earnings. On one hand, following a classic
view in capital markets research, how earnings is disseminated to investors is irrelevant.
Under this view, the market reaction to earnings is based solely on its information content and
credibility (Merton, 1987). On the other hand, the costly processing framework predicts that
information intermediaries, such as FDPs, reduce costs of identifying and processing relevant
earnings information, leading to a more efficient price discovery process (e.g., Bloomfield,
2002). Therefore, our next step is to test whether street earnings activation delay has
consequences for post-announcement price discovery.
To examine investors’ reliance on TR for street earnings information, in Section 4.1,
we employ a difference-in-differences research design based on the TR-specific methodology
change to see if this change impacted the market reaction timeliness to earnings news. Next,
in Section 4.2, we use short-window intraday tests to examine price discovery around TR
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street earnings activations.
4.1 Street Earnings Activation Delay and Market Reaction Time-
liness
4.1.1 Measuring Market Reaction Timeliness
Traditionally, in testing behavioral theories involving a delayed market reaction to
news, researchers have sought to demonstrate that factors that cause delayed information
processing are negatively related to the announcement-window earnings response coefficient
(ERC) and positively related to the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) (e.g., Hirsh-
leifer et al., 2009). However, in recent years, financial markets have become more efficient
(Bai et al., 2016) and the post earnings announcement drift has largely disappeared (Chordia
et al., 2014; Gregoire and Martineau, 2018). Therefore, it is highly unlikely it will take the
market weeks or months to incorporate street earnings information into prices.15 As a result,
we investigate the relation between TR street earnings processing delay and the speed of the
market reaction to earnings news over the first 5 days after the earnings announcement.
We follow prior literature (e.g., Butler et al., 2007; Bushman et al., 2010; Twedt, 2016;
Lyle et al., 2017; Drake et al., 2017) and estimate the speed with which stock prices respond
to earnings using market reaction timeliness (MRT, henceforth).16 Specifically, we calculate
the buy-and-hold abnormal return of each day over the [0, 5] trading window, scaled by
the buy-and-hold abnormal return for the entire six-day window. Stated formally, MRT is
defined as follows:












whereBHAR[0,t] is the buy-and-hold abnormal return up to and including day t andBHAR[0,5]
is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over the entire six-day period after the earnings an-
15Consistent with this, in untabulated tests, we find no evidence of PEAD in our sample of I/B/E/S-
covered quarterly earnings announcements from 2006 to 2015. However, we do find untabulated evidence of
a significant negative association between street earnings activation delay and short window ERC.
16Prior studies have labelled this measure as “intraperiod timeliness” (IPT) when examining either the
timeliness of returns within a fiscal period or within an event post-announcement period. We use the label
“market reaction timeliness” to clarify that we are examining a post-announcement period.
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nouncement.17
Intuitively, holding the magnitude of the price response and information content fixed,
MRT captures the timeliness with which earnings news is impounded into price. By con-
struction, each point of MRT measures a daily return realization relative to the return for
the entire [0,5] window, based on the assumption that street earnings information is fully in-
corporated in prices by trading day t+5 relative to the press release day t.18 Price discovery
is more (less) efficient, resulting in larger (smaller) values of MRT, if earlier days over the
six-day period account for a larger (smaller) portion of BHAR[0,5].
Figure 3 plots the six-day MRT curves for firms in the highest and lowest activation
delay deciles. We observe that around 70% of the six-day abnormal return, BHAR[0,5], is
realized during the first two days for firms with the shortest activation delay, compared to
around 59% return realization for firms with the longest activation delay. This graphical
evidence suggests that longer activation delays result in a less efficient price discovery of
earnings news.19
4.1.2 Testing Investors’ Reliance
To test a causal link between TR activation delay and the speed of investors’ process-
ing of earnings, we examine MRT in the pre- and post-periods of TR-specific methodology
change. In September 2009, TR increased its data timeliness by eliminating the “held out”
period for companies with “unexpected” charges or gains.20 Accordingly, using a difference-
in-differences (DID) approach, we test whether TR’s 2009 methodology change differentially
impacted MRT for those firm-quarters likely affected by the elimination of the “held-out” pe-
17Following prior literature, we truncate the sample at |BHAR[0,5]| < 1% to avoid small denominator
problems.
18Some observations have MRT values greater than 100% ofBHAR[0,5], indicating overreactions to earnings
news. However, Figure 3 demonstrates that, on average, MRT increases monotonically towards 100% in our
sample. We observe similar patterns for longer windows, e.g., MRT[0,10], however, differences in price
efficiency in later days (days +6 to +10) are relatively small.
19We confirm our results in Figure 3 by regressing MRT on street earnings activation delay and control
variables from Eq.(1). Results are not tabulated.
20Our results in Section 3.4 demonstrate that, ceteris paribus, firm-quarters reporting an Unexpected Item
exhibited longer activation delays prior to this methodology change, but afterwards exhibit no incremental
delay relative to other firm-quarters.
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riod. Following TR’s methodology guide (see Thomson Reuters (2009)), we identify treated
firm-quarters as those that contain an Unexpected Item. Our control group consists of all
other firm-quarters. If a significant portion of investors rely on TR to process street earnings
information, we expect MRT to increase, particularly among treated firms, following the
2009 methodology change. Alternatively, if the association between street earnings activa-
tion delay and MRT is non-causal, i.e., TR simply incurs similar earnings processing costs
as investors, we have no reason to expect an improvement in MRT in 2009 that differs for
treated vs. untreated firms.21
To illustrate the differential shock to street earnings activation delay around the 2009
methodology change, Figure 4(a) plots the average street earnings activation delay for treated
(control) earnings announcements that report (do not report) an Unexpected Item. We
observe a significant drop in the activation delay, from around 2,800 minutes to less than
200 minutes, for announcements that report an Unexpected Item, while the drop in the
activation delay for non-Unexpected Item firms is roughly half as large. Observing some
decrease in activation delay for control firms suggests that our classification of firms into
treated and control groups is imperfect. However, this imperfect assignment of firms into
treated vs. control biases us against finding the predicted results.
To formally test the effect of the TR-specific methodology change on MRT, we estimate
the following model:
MRT [0, 5] = α+ β1 × Unexpected Item+ β2Post+
β3Post× Unexpected Item+B × Controls+ C × FirmFE + ε.
(3)
where Unexpected Item equals to one if a firm reports at least one unexpected charge or gain,
and zero otherwise; Post is equal to one for announcements after September 30, 2009, and
zero otherwise; Controls is a vector of covariates from Eq.(1) not related to the methodology
21Our conversations with TR representatives indicate that the 2009 methodology change was executed
as part of the merger between the First Call and I/B/E/S databases. Thus, we believe the improvement
in activation delay following the methodology change is TR-specific. We are not aware of any concurrent
shocks in September 2009 that would cause investors to deferentially improve their processing of earnings
news for firms reporting unexpected items vs. those that do not.
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change. We include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics of
treated and control firms. In this model, Post × Unexpected Item captures the differential
effect of the methodology change on MRT for firms that report unexpected charges/gains
(treated) relative to those that do not report unexpected charges/gains (control).
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of the difference-in-differences analysis in Eq.
(3). We find a positive coefficient on Post × Unexpected Item, indicating that TR’s method-
ology change to eliminate the “held-out” period for firms with unexpected items significantly
increased the timeliness of market reactions to earnings for these firms. This result holds for
the full sample of firms (coef. = 0.144, t-stat = 2.46) as well as for a subsample of firms in
the highest and lowest activation delay deciles (coef. = 0.431, t-stat = 3.17). Figure 4(b)
provides graphical evidence for the effect of the TR methodology change on MRT. While
we observe an increase in MRT for non-Unexpected Item firms, the increase in MRT for
Unexpected Item firms is almost twice as large. This corroborates our evidence in Panel B
of Table 4 that TR’s methodology change had a significant impact on MRT for firms that
were subject to the methodology change. Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of placebo
tests, where we randomly manipulate the treatment and control groups as well as the timing
of the methodology change. In both placebo tests, Post × Unexpected Item is insignificant,
suggesting that our documented results are specific to the TR methodology change.22
Overall, our findings of more timely market reactions to street earnings for firms with
shorter TR activation delays as well as our findings of the impact of the TR methodology
change on market reactions suggest that TR plays an important role in disseminating street
earnings information to market participants.
4.2 Intraday Tests of Investors’ Reliance
The results in Section 4.1 are consistent with investors relying on TR to process street
earnings information. However, it is possible that the 2009 change in how TR processes
earnings coincides with a change in how investors process earnings. Moreover, given the
22The notes to Table 4 provide a full description of the randomzation methods used for the placebo tests.
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concentration and speed of events surrounding earnings announcements in recent years and
considering TR’s dramatic improvement in the timeliness of street earnings processing after
2009, using daily market reaction tests may be insufficient to draw robust inferences. To
increase confidence in our conclusions, we conduct intraday price discovery tests in the post-
2009 period.23 Intraday tests allow us to examine very short windows around the exact time
of street earnings activations in I/B/E/S. If TR facilitates the process by which the capital
market discovers street earnings in the post-2009 period, then we should expect increased
price discovery during the short window after street earnings are activated.
We use 15-minute intervals around earnings announcement and street earnings activa-
tion timestamps to estimate what portion of the two-day cumulative announcement return
is concentrated around these events.24 Stated formally, we estimate the following model:












θiPost ACTi + ε, (4)
where the relative price discovery (RPDt) for each 15-minute interval t over the two days




, Pre ANNt equals one for the ith 15-minute pre-announcement
interval, Post ANNi equals one for the ith 15-minute post-announcement interval, and
Pre ACTi and Post ACTi are similarly defined for the pre- and post-activation intervals.
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αFE is a vector of fixed effects indicators. We include hourly time-of-day fixed effects in the
regression to control for the fact that price discovery may be concentrated at certain times of
day, such as the market opening hour.26 We also include calendar year-quarter fixed effects,
and require all firm-quarters to have [-960, +960] returns with an absolute value greater than
23Similar RPD tests appear in prior studies examining priority dissemination of earnings news (Dong et al.,
2015), analysts’ response to corporate news events (Li et al., 2015), and investors’ response to I/B/E/S
activations of analyst forecasts (Akbas et al., 2018).
24Our inferences remain unchanged if we estimate our tests over the full 2006–2015 sample period.
25We use TAQ data to examine trading during both regular and extended trading hours. As in Li et al.
(2015) and Akbas et al. (2018), we examine 960-minute trading days (4:00AM to 8:00PM), and winsorize
RPDt at -1 and 1 to mitigate the effect of extreme observations.
26Hourly time-of-day fixed effects are indicator variables that take a value of one if the 15-minute interval
begins within a given hour, and zero otherwise. For example, we include an indicator equal to one if the
15-minute interval begins between 8AM and 8:59AM, another indicator equal to one if the 15-minute interval
begins between 9AM to 9:59AM, and so forth. Our results are stronger when these fixed effects are excluded.
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1% to avoid small denominator problems (as in Section 4.1).
Our intraday research design has several unique features that facilitate identification.
First, including Post ANNi and Post ACTi indicators helps isolate the incremental effect
of street earnings activations on price discovery from the general post-earnings announce-
ment drift phenomenon (Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989). We should
only observe positive coefficients on the Post ACTi indicators if activations facilitate price
discovery beyond what is generally observed during Post ANNi windows (Li et al., 2015).
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Second, examining 16 pre- and 16 post- intervals around both announcement and
activation allows us to examine the extent of measurement error or information leakage
in our press release and street earnings activation timestamps. If increased price discovery
is concentrated immediately upon the earnings press release (street earnings activation), we
expect a positive coefficient on the Post ANN1 (Post ACT1) indicator. If some investors
receive privileged pre-announcement access to earnings news (Dong et al., 2015), we may
also observe significant positive coefficients on the Pre ANNt indicators. Similarly, if some
I/B/E/S customers receive privileged (delayed) data updates, we may observe significant
positive coefficients on Pre ACTi indicators (in the case of privileged data updates) or
on longer lagged Post ACTi indicators (in the case of delayed price discovery following
activations).
Lastly, time of day is a strong determinant of intraday price discovery. Early intraday
studies control for time of day effects using placebo announcements at the same time of day
(e.g, Brown et al., 1992; Lee et al., 1993). More recent studies employing RPD tests partition
their regression samples between regular, extended, and non-trading hours announcements
(Li et al., 2015; Akbas et al., 2018). A unique feature of our research setting is that earnings
press releases are clustered around two times of day (see Figure 2), a pre-market cluster
between 7:00AM-7:59AM (20.04% of the RPD sample) and a post-market cluster between
27 If the overlaps among included variables are substantial, multicollinearity could be a problem (Li et al.,
2015). However, the largest variance inflation factor observed for any of the variables in our models is 1.32,
suggesting that the statistical significance of our estimated coefficients is unlikely affected by this overlap.
26
4:00PM-4:59PM (46.27% of the RPD sample). Accordingly, to further facilitate identification
and control for any variation in price discovery patterns due to announcement timing, we
estimate our model separately on each of these clusters (referred to as the 7AM and 4PM
samples, respectively). We also control for time-of-day effects by including hourly fixed
effects in all models.
Table 5 presents the regression results for the full, 7AM, and 4PM samples of press
releases. To facilitate exposition, we tabulate only coefficients for the 8 pre- and 8 post-
indicators immediately before and after each event. In Column (1), the coefficient of 0.057
(t-stat=22.48) on Post ANN+1 indicates that, on average, the first 15 minutes following an
earnings announcement exhibit increased price discovery equivalent to 5.7% of the overall
[-960,+960] trading minute return. Significant concentrations of price discovery continue
over the next two hours following the earnings announcement.
Turning to street earnings activations, we find that the coefficient on Post ACT+1
in Column (1) is 1.7% (t-stat=9.74). We also observe significantly positive coefficients for
Post ACT+2 through Post ACT+8, indicating a period of sustained increases in price dis-
covery for about two hours following street earnings activations. We observe similar results
for our 7AM and 4PM press release subsamples. Further, we examine whether there is an
increase in incremental price discovery from the one-hour period immediately preceding ac-
tivations to the one-hour period immediately following activations. Consistent with this,
the sum of the first four Post ACT coefficients is significantly higher than the sum of the
last four Pre ACT coefficients by 3.0%, 5.5%, and 2.6% for the full sample, 7AM, and 4PM
announcements, respectively.28
Figure 5 provides a visual summary of our RPD results for the full post-2009 sam-
ple, focusing on the hour before and after press release announcements and street earnings
28Interestingly, this result holds despite significant positive coefficients on Pre ACT−1 in all samples. The
positive coefficients on Pre ACT−1 indicate increased price discovery in the 15-minute period prior to the
I/B/E/S street earnings activation. This result suggest that some I/B/E/S customers receive privileged
data dissemination prior to the activation. Alternatively, there is a measurement error in the activation
timestamps provided in the I/B/E/S academic data.
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activations. The blue (red) series plots the estimated coefficients around press release an-
nouncements (street earnings activations), with error bars indicating the 95% confidence
intervals around each estimated coefficient. Visually, both earnings press releases and street
earnings activations clearly exhibit significant post-event increases in intraday RPD, with
the increases following the initial press releases naturally being larger in magnitude than
those following street earnings activations.
Overall, the results of our intraday tests provide evidence of increases in price discov-
ery during the hour following I/B/E/S activations, indicating that investors rely on TR to
process street earnings information. It is possible, but highly unlikely, that investors not
only determine street earnings independent of TR, but also intensify the price discovery at
the exact time street earnings are incorporated in TRs data feeds. However, given that we
find consistent evidence across our difference-in-difference tests in Section 4.1 and intraday
tests in this section, it is improbable that our collective results are attributable to alternate
explanations. Furthermore, in the Internet Appendix we demonstrate that our model of ac-
tivation delay has intraday investment value during the post-2009 period, lending additional
credence to the hypothesis that the market relies on TR.29
5 Do Analysts Rely on I/B/E/S for Street Earnings Information?
The results in Section 4 provide evidence that TR’s processing of street earnings in-
formation affects investors’ response to earnings news. A related question is whether TR’s
street earnings processing has implications for other capital market participants. Given that
sell-side analysts have strong compensation-based incentives for quick information processing
and dissemination (Cooper et al., 2001) and that investors value timely post-announcement
analyst forecasts and recommendation revisions (Stickel, 1989; Zhang, 2008; Yezegel, 2015),
in this section, we examine the relation between street earnings activation delay and sell-side
29Specifically, we find that sorting on expected activation delay (based on Eq.(1)) improves the profitability




In forming their forecasts, analysts reference the current street earnings surprise as
it provides relevant performance information for the quarter just ended and helps evaluate
future company prospects. While analysts surely calculate their own street earnings surprises
independent of TR (or any other forecast data provider), they likely rely on TR to determine
and disseminate street earnings consistent with the majority of analysts. Arguably, it is
more efficient for one party (the FDP) to aggregate N individual forecasts, discover the
majority basis, and adjust earnings for consistency with it, than for all N analysts to repeat
this process independently. Moreover, to mitigate biases pertaining to individual forecasts,
brokerage houses often require their analysts to discuss multiple earnings surprise metrics,
not just the analyst’s own surprise. Indeed, Figure 6 provides two examples of snippets from
Morgan Stanley analyst reports that summarize both realized and expected EPS performance
using both Morgan Stanley’s own street earnings calculations as well as street earnings
numbers provided by TR (highlighted in yellow).31 Hence, if some analysts rely on TR for
street earnings information, we expect that TR’s activation delay of the current quarter
earnings leads to delays in analysts’ forecasts following the earnings announcement. To test
this prediction, we estimate the following equation:
Ln(AnalystDelayi,t) = α + β × Ln(Activation Delay)i,t + θ × Γ + YearQtrFE + εi,t, (5)
where AnalystDelayi,t is the time (in minutes) from when firm i announces quarter t earnings
to when an analyst issues her next quarter EPS forecast, averaged across all analysts who
issue their forecasts for firm i within the [0,5] day window. Γ is a vector of control variables
that explain the time it takes an analyst to issue her forecast and includes variables from
Eq. (1) as well as Conference Call Lag and 8K Filing Lag to control for the arrival of new
30Clement et al. (2011) document that most analysts issue their forecasts shortly after an earnings an-
nouncement. In our sample, around 95% of observations have at least one analyst issuing next quarter’s
forecast during the first five days after the earnings announcement.
31In private conversations with a Morgan Stanley analyst, we confirmed that it is a common practice to
use street earnings numbers reported by FDPs.
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information and relevant analyst/broker characteristics.32 We expect a positive coefficient
on Ln(Activation Delay) (i.e., β > 0).
A positive coefficient on Ln(Activation Delay) in Eq.(5) may arise from either analysts
relying on TR for street earnings information or analysts facing similar processing costs as
TR. Given that prior to the 2009 methodology change TR waited on analysts to process
unexpected items before determining whether to include or exclude these items from street
earnings, we cannot use the difference-in-difference analysis based on TR’s methodology
change that we used in Section 4 to identify analysts’ reliance on TR.33 Instead, we employ an
instrumental variables (IV) approach and focus on the post-2009 period where TR processes
street earnings actuals strictly based on the pre-announcement consensus forecasting basis.
Specifically, we use the number of firms in TR’s activation queue (Unactivated Actuals) as
an instrument to isolate the variation in activation delay that is exogenous to analysts’ own
processing and estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) system of equations, where the first
stage specification is:
Ln(Activation Delay)i,t = α + β × Ln(UnactivatedActuals)i,t + θ × Γ + YearQtrFE + ui,t,
while Eq.(5) is the second stage specification.
This instrument is motivated by the idea that TR is tasked with processing earnings
announcements for more than 3,000 firms, while an individual analyst covers, on average,
10 firms. Our key economic assumption is that, in processing a given firm’s earnings an-
nouncement, concurrent announcements by other I/B/E/S firms distract TR specialists,
while analysts are only distracted by the announcements of firms that they cover. Empiri-
cally, we find virtually no overlap between Unactivated Actuals and a given analysts’ coverage
32Table 2 presents summary statistics on Analyst Delay, and the additional analyst forecast delay controls.
Analyst Delay has a mean (median) of 1,672 (1,291) minutes and varies between 573 minutes at the 5th
percentile and 4,179 minutes at the 95th percentile. Descriptives for the added control variables are within
their expected ranges.
33We observe (untabulated) that prior to the TR methodology change, analysts’ post-earnings announce-
ment forecasts are often announced prior to TR street earnings activation, especially for firms with unex-
pected items (around 37% of analysts announce prior to activation). In contrast, after the 2009 methodology
change, only around 1% of analysts announce their forecasts prior to TR street earnings activation, regardless
of the presence of unexpected items.
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portfolio.34 Thus, we assume that Unactivated Actuals are relevant to TR’s activation delay,
but exogenous with respect to analysts’ forecast delay.
The relevance condition in our IV specification is that Ln(Activation Delay) varies with
Ln(Unactivated Actuals). The exclusion restriction is that the only channel through which
TR’s unactivated actuals affect analyst forecast delay is that of street earnings activation
delay. Column (1) of Table 6 reports the results of the first stage of the instrumental variables
approach. The positive and significant coefficient on Ln(Unactivated Actuals) indicates that
our instrument satisfies the relevance condition - the higher the number of firms in TR’s
activation queue, the longer it takes TR to activate the earnings actual for a given firm.
This relation is also confirmed by the under-identification χ2-statistics, which strongly rejects
the null of no relevance of the selected instrument. Further, the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F -
statistic for weak instruments (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) is 25.29, suggesting that weak
instruments is not a problem in our setting.
Column (2) of Table 6 presents the results of the second stage of the instrumental vari-
ables approach. Using Ln(Unactivated Actuals) as an instrument for Ln(Activation Delay)
in Eq.(5), we find that a one standard deviation increase in instrumented street earnings
activation delay leads to an approximate 19.5% increase in analysts’ forecasting delay.35
Relative to the sample mean, this translates to an incremental average forecasting delay of
approximately 5.4 hours. For completeness, in Column (3), we also report the coefficient
estimates from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Consistent with our IV esti-
mates, we find that a one standard deviation increase in Ln(Activation Delay) is associated
with an approximately 4.2% longer analyst forecast delay. Overall, the results reported in
Table 6 provide evidence consistent with financial analysts relying on TR’s street earnings
actuals when updating their post-announcement earnings forecasts.
34In untabulated tests, we find that the mean (median) overlap between firms in TR’s queue and firms in
firm i’s analysts’ portfolio is 1 (0). In addition, analysts may also be distracted by announcements of firms
in the industries they follow. We obtain similar (untabulated) results if we calculate Unactivated Actuals as
the difference between all firms in TR’s queue and firms in TR’s queue that are in the same Fama-French
48 industry portfolio as a given firm i.
35We find similar results (untabulated) if we include firm fixed effects in the specification of Eq.(5).
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6 Conclusion
Our study offers new insights into how earnings information is incorporated in capital
markets. We introduce a simple framework that emphasizes the role of information frictions
in the production and distribution of street earnings in capital markets, and makes explicit
the role of forecast data providers in alleviating these frictions. Consistent with predictions
derived from this framework, we present novel evidence about the delay with which street
earnings are constructed, disseminated, and impounded in market prices. Specifically, we
find that significant variation in FDP street earnings activation delay is explained by earnings
and press release complexity, as well as the supply of and demand for FDPs’ attention. In
cross-sectional tests, we also find that, when faced with competing earnings announcements,
FDPs prioritize their information processing backlog according to firm visibility. Further, we
present evidence that equity analysts and investors incorporate street earnings information
in earnings forecasts and prices with a delay, and that this delay is partially driven by the
delay with which TR disseminates I/B/E/S street earnings.
Thomson Reuters is one of several FDPs that adjust GAAP earnings for consistency
with their own proprietary consensus forecasts,36 which raises the question of generalizability
of our evidence. Lacking data on other FDPs, we offer several observations. First, we
expect our results on the determinants of activation delay to hold in the main. Our analysis
incorporates general as well as setting-specific determinants of information processing in
capital markets, which likely apply to other data providers. Second, other FDPs are likely
to differ from TR in their construction and dissemination of street earnings to the extent
that their clients differ in sophistication and demand for timely information. Finally, whether
other FDPs contribute more or less to price efficiency likely depends on how well their versions
of street earnings approximate “true” operating earnings, as well as speed and breadth of
dissemination. We leave it to future research to collect data on other FDPs and paint a more
complete picture of the supply of street earnings to the market.
36Prominent TR competitors include Capital IQ, FactSet, Bloomberg, and Zacks.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources.
Variable Definition
Earnings Processing Complexity
Activation Delay Time (in minutes) from the press release time until activation time
(Source: I/B/E/S, WSH, RavenPack).
Potential Exclusions The total number of times any of the following fourteen charges have
been reported in a given quarter: restructuring charge, acquisition ex-
pense or gain, net credit or charge to reserves for bad debts from loan
recoveries or charge-offs, nonrecurring income taxes, settlement of litiga-
tion or insurance, asset write-down, goodwill impairment, special items,
currency translation adjustment, gain or loss from investments, gain or
loss from the sale of property, stock compensation, extraordinary items
and discontinued operations, and accounting change (Source: Compus-
tat).
Abs(GAAP-Street Diff) The absolute value of the difference between Compustat earnings before
extraordinary items per share and I/B/E/S earnings per share, scaled by
the absolute value of I/B/E/S earnings (Source:I/B/E/S, Compustat)
Surprise Actual earnings per share minus the median analyst earnings per share
forecast over the last 90 days deflated by the absolute value of the median
forecast (Source: I/B/E/S, CRSP).
Abs(Surprise) The absolute value of Surprise (Source: I/B/E/S, CRSP).
Bad News A dummy variable that equals one if Surprise is negative and zero oth-
erwise (Source: I/B/E/S, CRSP).
Reporting Lag Number of days between the fiscal year and and the earnings announce-
ment day (Source: I/B/E/S, Compustat, RavenPack, WSH).
QTR4 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is announcing its 4th fiscal
quarter earnings and zero otherwise (Source: Compustat).
EPS Guidance A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has issued an earnings guid-
ance during the current fiscal quarter (Source: I/B/E/S).
Press Release Complexity
Total Words Total number of words in the earnings press release (Source: SEC
EDGAR).
Non-GAAP Words The number of non-GAAP trigger words or phrases contained in the
press release (e.g., any variation of words such as “adjust”, “exclude”,
“proforma”, “non-GAAP”, “remove”, “without”, “except for”, etc.)
scaled by the total number of words in the press release (Source: SEC
EDGAR).
HardInfoMix The number of informative numbers (e.g., numbers that are not asso-
ciated with dates or headings) in the press release relative to the total




Operations The total number of words in the earnings press release related to day-
to-day company operations or strategy (e.g., products, advertising, ac-
counts receivable, contractors) scaled by the total number of words in
the press release (Source: SEC EDGAR).
Demand for Timely Processing
Market value Market value of the firm as of the most recent fiscal quarter end before
the earnings announcement day (Source: Compustat).
Advertising Expense Total advertising expense as of the most recent fiscal year end before the
earnings announcement day (Source: Compustat).
Media Coverage Number of news stories published on the firm over the one month before
the earnings announcement (Source: RavenPack).
General Visibility (Factor) Principal factor based on Market value, Advertising Expense, and Media
Coverage.
Analyst Following Number of analysts covering the firm over the one-year period ending on
the most recent month end before an earnings announcement (Source:
I/B/E/S).
Institutional Ownership The percentage of shares held by 13F institutions as of the end of the
most recent calendar quarter before the earnings announcement (Source:
Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum Institutional Holdings s34).
Firm Age Number of years since the firm’s initial public offering data (Source:
CRSP, Compustat).
S&P 500 A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is in the S&P 500 index




Principal factor based on Analyst Following, Institutional Ownership,
Firm Age , and S&P 500.
Limited Attention/Resources
Unactivated Actuals The number of all unactivated (as of the earnings announcement minute)
earnings announcements by other firms over the [-5, 0] calendar day win-
dow, where day 0 is the earnings announcement day (Source: I/B/E/S).
After Market Close A dummy variable that equals one of earnings is announced after market
closes and zero otherwise (Source: I/B/E/S, Compustat, RavenPack,
WSH).
Friday A dummy variable that equals one if the announcement day is Friday





Post A dummy variable that equals one for observations in the post 2009 Q3
period and zero otherwise.
Unexpected Item A dummy variable that equals one if a company reports any of the fol-
lowing eight unexpected charges/gains in a quarter: a large restructuring
charge, a large acquisition expense or gain, net credit or charge to re-
serves for bad debts from loan recoveries or charge-offs, nonrecurring
income taxes, settlement of litigation or insurance, asset write-down,
goodwill impairment, and large special items. An item is classified as
large if it is in the top decile of the sample distribution of its absolute
value (Source: Compustat).
Outcome Variables











+ 0.5, where BHAR[0,t]
is the buy-and-hold abnormal return up to and including day t and
BHAR[0,5] is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over the entire six-day
period after the earnings announcement (Source: CRSP).
RPD Relative price discovery for each 15-minute interval t over the two-day
window ([-960, +960] trading minutes) surrounding an earnings an-





Firm Specific Experience Number of years the analyst has been issuing earnings forecasts on the
firm (Source: I/B/E/S).
Broker Size The number of analysts employed by the broker covering the firm as of
the firm’s earnings announcement (Source: I/B/E/S).
Conference Call A dummy variable that equals one if the firm has hosted an earnings
conference call within five days after the earnings announcement and
zero otherwise (Source: WSH).
Conference Call Lag The time (in minutes) between the earnings announcement time and the
conference call time (Source: I/B/E/S, Compustat, RavenPack, WSH).
8K Filing Lag The time (in minutes) between the earnings announcement time and the
8-K filing time (Source: I/B/E/S, Compustat, RavenPack, WSH).
Earnings Announcements Number of earnings announcements made during the [-5,0] window rela-
tive to a firm’s earnings announcement, where day 0 is the firm’s earnings
announcement day (Source: I/B/E/S).
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Tables and Figures































This figure shows the timeline of the quarterly earnings disclosure process staring at the fiscal
period end and ending at the filing date of the quarterly (10-Q) or annual (10-K) report. The
mean (median) time distances between relevant events for our sample of quarterly earnings an-
nouncements are reported along curly brackets.
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Figure 2: Distributions of Press Release and Street Earnings Activation Times,






00:00 02:00 04:00 06:00 08:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 20:00 22:00 00:00









This figure plots the frequency (%) of observations in our sample with event timestamps occur-
ring during a given hour of the day. The blue density curve plots the frequency of press release
announcements and the red density curve plots the frequency of I/B/E/S street earnings data
activations.
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Figure 3: Intraperiod Market Reaction Timeliness Curves for Firms in the






0 1 2 3 4 5























This figure plots daily averages of market reaction timeliness (MRT) of earnings for firms in the
shortest and longest activation delay deciles over the six-day period after the earnings announce-
ment. The activation delay deciles are created using quarterly sorts of earnings announcements
of Activation Delay. Day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement. MRT[0,t] is equal to the
cumulative buy-and-hold return from day 0 to day t, divided by the cumulative abnormal return
for the entire six-day window.
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Figure 4: Activation Delay and Market Reaction Timeliness of Earnings in the Pre- and



















































































































































































Unexpected Item > 0Unexpected Item = 0
This figure plots the average street earnings activation delay (part (a)) and market reaction timeliness
(MRT[0,5]) of earnings (part (b)) over the period 2006-2015 for Unexpected Item firms (treated group)
and non-Unexpected Item firms (control group). Part (b) plots one-year moving averages of MRT[0,5].
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Figure 5: Intraday Price Discovery Increases around Quarterly Earnings Press
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This figure plots the estimated coefficients from Model 4. Error bars note the 95% confidence
intervals around each coefficient estimate.
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Figure 6: Examples of Analyst Reports Citing Thomson Reuters Street
Earnings
This figure shows snippets of Morgan Stanley analyst reports for AT&T (left side) and Ford Motor (right
side) companies, published on January 28, 2015 and March 14, 2018, respectively.
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Table 1: Sample Selection.
Observations
Firm-quarters with earnings announcement dates from 2006 to 2015 with
valid quarterly unadjusted EPS actual and activation delay data avail-
able on I/B/E/S
194,728
After requiring common stocks on NYSE, NYSE MKT, NASDAQ, or
NYSE ARCA with stock price greater than $1
136,393
After requiring earnings announcement timestamp data from Wall Street
Horizon
127,867
With valid timestamp on the same date from Ravenpack 86,702
With 8-K data available from EDGAR 71,408




Sample for [0,5] day market reaction timeliness tests 59,257
(Full Sample less firm-quarters with [0,5] announcement-window abnor-
mal returns with absolute value less than 1%)
Sample for intraday price discovery tests 36,347
(Full Sample firm-quarters with earnings announcement dates between
October 1, 2009 and December 31, 2015 with available data from TAQ,
less observations with [-960,960] trading minute announcement-window
returns with absolute value less than 1%)
This table describes the sample selection procedure used to collect the data analyzed in our study.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Mean Std Dev 5th Pctl Median 95th Pctl
Activation Delay 594 1,742 6 44 4,288
Earnings Processing Complexity
Abs(GAAP-Street Diff) 0.59 1.96 0.00 0.02 2.68
Potential Exclusions 2.65 1.43 1.00 2.00 5.00
Surprise −0.01 1.23 −1.16 0.04 1.11
Abs(Surprise) 0.57 1.49 0.00 0.14 2.50
Bad News 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
EPS Guidance 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
QTR4 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00
Reporting Lag 33 12 18 31 57
Press Release Complexity
Total Words 3,629 4,079 1,427 2,859 7,724
Non-GAAP Words (%) 0.68 0.66 0.00 0.50 1.92
HardInfoMix (%) 4.65 4.34 0.81 3.22 12.78
Operations (%) 6.98 2.12 3.57 6.99 10.50
Demand for Timely Processing
General Visibility (Factor) 0.00 0.87 −0.43 −0.30 1.39
Market Value ($millions) 4,564 11,920 78 925 20,894
Advertising Expense($millions) 33 136 0 0 152
Media Coverage 51 397 0 15 141
Inst. Investor Visibility (Factor) 0.00 0.84 −0.92 −0.24 1.85
Analyst Following 11 9 2 9 30
Institutional Ownership 68.49 25.61 17.47 74.74 100.00
Firm Age 19.27 17.11 1.38 14.73 51.26
S&P 500 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00
Limited Attention/Resources
Unactivated Actuals 153 108 26 134 340
After Market Close 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00
Friday 0.055 0.228 0.000 0.000 1.000
IBES Methodology Change
Unexpected Item 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
Post 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00
Other
Analyst Delay (minutes) 1,672 1,179 573 1,291 4,179
Firm Specific Experience 3.23 2.14 0.68 2.81 7.09
Broker Size 49 26 16 42 100
Conference Call 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00 1.00
Conference Call Lag (minutes) 322 387 29 129 1,100
8K Filing Lag (minutes) 336 966 0 32 1,615
Earnings Announcements 321 154 69 316 576
This table presents summary statistics for street earnings activation delay and its determinants.
The sample includes 67,908 quarterly earnings announcements made by 4,367 unique NYSE- and
Nasdaq-listed firms between January 2006 and December 2015. Variable definitions are reported in
Appendix A.1.
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Table 3: Analysis of Street Earnings Activation Delay.
Panel A: Determinants of Street Earnings Activation Delay
Exp. Sign Coef. Est. Marg. Effect
Earnings Processing Complexity
Potential Exclusions + 0.073∗∗∗ 45.00
(4.13)
Abs(GAAP-Street Diff) + 0.074∗∗∗ 45.64
(6.75)
Abs(Surprise) + 0.081∗∗∗ 50.13
(5.55)
Bad News + 0.119∗∗∗ 75.09
(5.66)




Reporting Lag + 0.077∗∗∗ 47.56
(3.67)
Press Release Complexity
Ln(Total Words) + 0.085∗∗∗ 52.71
(7.53)




Operations + 0.071∗∗∗ 43.72
(5.75)
Demand for Timely Processing
General Visibility - −0.074∗∗∗ −42.38
(−3.54)
Inst. Investor Visibility - −0.078∗∗∗ −44.58
(−4.08)
Limited Attention/Resources
Ln(Unactivated Actuals) + 0.205∗∗∗ 135.19
(6.13)





Unexpected Item + 0.445∗∗∗ 333.03
(6.68)





This panel reports coefficient estimates from the following panel regression:
Ln(Activation Delay) = β1 × Earnings Processing Complexity + β2 × Press Release Complexity
+ β3 ×Demand for Timely Processing + β4 × Limited Attention/Resources
+ β5 × I/B/E/S Methodology Change + Y earQtrFE + ε.
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.1. The sample includes 67,908 quarterly earnings announce-
ments made by 4,367 unique NYSE-, Amex-, and Nasdaq-listed firms between January 2006 and December
2015. Year-quarter fixed effects are included in the regression, but are not reported. Standard errors are
clustered by firm and calendar year-quarter. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Marginal effects (in minutes) are based on a one standard
deviation (one unit) increase in each continuous (binary) determinant relative to the sample mean of 594
minutes.
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Table 3: Analysis of Street Earnings Activation Delay.
Panel B: FDP Queuing Behavior and Street Earnings Activation Delay
(1) (2) (3)
General Visibility −0.098∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗
(−5.10) (−4.39) (−4.46)
Inst. Investor Visibility −0.069∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(−3.71) (−3.86) (−3.84)
Ln(Unactivated Actuals) 0.206∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(6.12) (6.19) (6.19)
Ln(Unactivated Actuals)×General Visibility −0.036∗∗∗ −0.001
(−4.19) (−0.04)
Ln(Unactivated Actuals)×Inst. Investor Visibility −0.046∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(−4.92) (−3.09)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67,908 67,908 67,908
Adj. R2 0.502 0.503 0.503
This panel reports the estimated coefficients from a regression of Ln(Activation delay) on the number of
earnings announcements in TR’s activation queue, Ln(Unactivated actuals), and its interaction with measures
of firm visibility - General Visibility and Inst. Investor Visibility. Controls include all other variables reported
in Column (1) of Table 3, Panel A and are suppressed for brevity. Year-quarter fixed effects are included
in each regression, but are not reported. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.1. The sample
includes 67,908 quarterly earnings announcements made by 4,367 unique NYSE-, Amex-, and Nasdaq-listed
firms between January 2006 and December 2015. Standard errors are clustered by firm and calendar year-
quarter. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 4: Market Reaction Timeliness of Earnings (MRT).
Panel A: Effects of IBES Methodology Change on MRT.
(1) (2)
Full Sample High and Low Delay Deciles




Post × Unexpected Item 0.144∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(2.46) (3.17)
Controls Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 59,257 12,441
Adj. R2 0.027 0.045
Panel B: Placebo Tests of the Effects of IBES Methodology Change on MRT.
(1) (2)
Average Coef. Est. Random Treatment Random Shock




Post × Unexpected Item 0.001 0.055
(0.03) (0.91)
Controls Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
Observations 59,257 52,981
Average Adj. R2 0.026 0.027
Panel A reports the estimated coecients from a regression of MRT[0, 5] on Unexpected Item, indicator variable
for IBES methodology change, Post, interaction between Unexpected Item and Post, and controls. Column (1)
of Panel B reports results for the full sample, while Column (2) reports results for a subsample of firms in the
highest and lowest activation delay deciles. Panel B reports the average coefficient estimates and t-statistics
of placebo tests of manipulating the treatment group, Unexpected Item, and the time period of the IBES
methodology change, Post. In Column (1) of Panel B, Unexpected Item is the average coefficient estimate
corresponding to 100 random assignments of firms into treated (Unexpected Item = 1) and control groups
(Unexpected Item = 0). In Column (2) of Panel B, Post is the average coefficient estimate corresponding
to random assignments (based on year-quarter) of observations into pre- and post- periods, excluding all
observations in 2009 (the year of the methodology change). In all panels, control variables are the same as in
Table 3 and are defined in Appendix A.1. Calendar year-quarter and firm fixed effects are included in Panels
A and B, but are not reported. ***, **, * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively,
using the two-tailed t-test. Standard errors are clustered by firm and calendar year-quarter.
51
Table 5: Intraday Price Discovery around Earnings Announcements and their
Subsequent I/B/E/S Activations.
(1) (2) (3)
All announcements 7AM announcements 4PM announcements
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
pre ANN−8 −0.002∗∗ (−2.06) 0.000 (0.07) −0.003∗ (−1.95)
pre ANN−7 −0.001 (−1.11) 0.001 (0.95) −0.003∗ (−1.90)
pre ANN−6 −0.000 (−0.32) 0.000 (0.50) −0.001 (−0.46)
pre ANN−5 −0.002 (−1.62) 0.000 (0.48) −0.005∗∗ (−2.33)
pre ANN−4 −0.002∗∗ (−2.55) 0.001 (0.98) −0.004∗∗ (−2.33)
pre ANN−3 −0.001 (−1.44) 0.002 (1.53) −0.003∗ (−1.69)
pre ANN−2 0.000 (0.14) 0.003∗ (1.88) 0.000 (0.02)
pre ANN−1 −0.003∗∗∗ (−3.31) −0.001 (−0.43) −0.002 (−0.80)
post ANN+1 0.057
∗∗∗ (22.48) 0.031∗∗∗ (7.70) 0.091∗∗∗ (21.05)
post ANN+2 0.009
∗∗∗ (6.36) 0.004∗ (1.91) 0.018∗∗∗ (6.76)
post ANN+3 0.014
∗∗∗ (8.57) 0.010∗∗∗ (3.70) 0.018∗∗∗ (7.23)
post ANN+4 0.007
∗∗∗ (4.62) 0.009∗∗∗ (3.13) 0.011∗∗∗ (4.98)
post ANN+5 0.005
∗∗∗ (3.90) 0.023∗∗∗ (6.37) 0.003∗ (1.68)
post ANN+6 0.005
∗∗∗ (3.69) 0.006∗∗ (2.14) 0.005∗∗∗ (2.95)
post ANN+7 0.014
∗∗∗ (8.92) 0.009∗∗∗ (2.70) 0.002 (1.28)
post ANN+8 0.004
∗∗∗ (3.30) 0.014∗∗∗ (3.68) 0.001 (1.01)
pre ACT−8 0.001 (0.75) −0.000 (−0.15) 0.001 (0.58)
pre ACT−7 −0.000 (−0.53) −0.001 (−1.16) −0.001 (−0.75)
pre ACT−6 0.001 (1.04) −0.000 (−0.16) 0.002 (0.99)
pre ACT−5 −0.000 (−0.13) −0.001 (−0.57) −0.000 (−0.21)
pre ACT−4 −0.001 (−0.76) −0.001 (−0.66) −0.002 (−1.36)
pre ACT−3 −0.000 (−0.34) −0.003∗ (−1.84) 0.001 (0.47)
pre ACT−2 −0.000 (−0.25) −0.002 (−0.91) −0.002 (−1.16)
pre ACT−1 0.010∗∗∗ (6.92) 0.010∗∗∗ (3.38) 0.008∗∗∗ (3.31)
post ACT+1 0.017
∗∗∗ (9.74) 0.020∗∗∗ (5.51) 0.019∗∗∗ (6.43)
post ACT+2 0.008
∗∗∗ (5.41) 0.011∗∗∗ (3.63) 0.006∗∗ (2.57)
post ACT+3 0.007
∗∗∗ (4.44) 0.019∗∗∗ (5.56) 0.002 (1.14)
post ACT+4 0.007
∗∗∗ (4.90) 0.009∗∗ (2.41) 0.004∗∗ (2.13)
post ACT+5 0.006
∗∗∗ (4.07) 0.008∗∗∗ (2.60) 0.003∗∗ (2.02)
post ACT+6 0.004
∗∗∗ (2.78) 0.004 (1.22) 0.005∗∗∗ (3.02)
post ACT+7 0.004
∗∗∗ (2.79) 0.007∗ (1.73) 0.002 (1.33)
post ACT+8 0.005
∗∗∗ (3.89) 0.005 (1.30) 0.002∗ (1.80)
(Continued on the next page)
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(Continued from the previous page)
Year-Quarter FE Included Included Included









# of observations 4,652,416 932,224 2,152,704
Adjusted R2 (%) 0.7 1.5 0.8















where the relative price discovery (RPDt) for each 15-minute interval t over the two days window ([-960,




Pre ANNi equals one for the ith 15-minute pre-announcement interval, Post ANNi equals one for the ith
15-minute post-announcement interval, and Pre ACTi and Post ACTi are similarly defined for the pre- and
post-activation intervals. To facilitate exposition, we tabulate only coefficients for the 8 pre- and 8 post-
indicators around each event. We also include but do not tabulate year-quarter and hourly time-of-day
fixed effects in each regression. Following Li et al. (2015) and Akbas et al. (2018), we use TAQ data to
examine trading during both regular and extended trading hours, such that a full trading day covers 960
trading minutes (4:00AM to 8:00PM). For trading occurring during regular trading hours, we keep only
trades that meet all of the following criteria: (1) trades occurring on the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq; (2)
trades made under regular market conditions (i.e., COND codes ‘ ’,‘*’,‘@’,‘E’,‘F’,‘@F’,‘6’,‘@6‘,‘M’,‘O’); (3)
trades without subsequent cancellations; and (4) trades where the transaction price and the number of shares
traded were both positive. For trades during extended trading hours, we include trades with COND codes
‘T’,‘F’,‘@’, and ‘@F’, which represent the bulk of all extended-hour trades. In terms of EX codes, we exclude
extended-hour trades in NYSE and Amex as they are likely to represent regular session closing transactions
that are reported after 4PM As in Li et al. (2015) and Akbas et al. (2018), we winsorize RPDt at -1 and
1 to mitigate the effect of extreme observations. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm and
announcement date are reported beside each coefficient estimate. Separate regressions are estimated for all
press releases (full sample), press releases announced between 7:00AM – 7:59AM (7AM subsample), and press
releases announced between 4:00PM – 4:59PM (4PM subsample). Wald tests of the (two-sided) hypothesis∑4
i=1 θiPost ACTi−
∑−1
i=−4 θiPre ACTi = 0 are presented below each regression, with F-statistics displayed
in parentheses below the differences in coefficients. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6: I/B/E/S Activation Delay and Analyst Responsiveness to Earnings News
(IV) (OLS)
First Stage Second Stage
(1) (2) (3)




Controls Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41,403 41,403 41,403
Adj. R2 0.212 0.246 0.293







This table shows the estimated coefficients from a regression of analyst forecast delay (Analyst Delay)
on the earnings activation delay (Ln(Activation Delay)), other firm characteristics, and year-quarter fixed
effects. Analyst Delay is the natural logarithm of the average time (in minutes) from the firm’s earnings
announcement until an analyst issues a forecast of next quarter earnings over the six-day ([0,5]) window
after the earnings announcement. Controls is the vector of control variables used in Eq.(1) as well as 8K
Filing Lag, Conference Call, Conference Call Lag, Firm Specific Experience, and Broker Size. All variables
are defined in Appendix A.1. All continuous independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0
and standard deviation of 1. Columns (1) and (2) report the first and second stages of the two-stage least
squares (2SLS) instrumental variables estimation, respectively. Column (3) reports the estimated coefficients
using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The sample includes 41,403 firm-quarters observations
corresponding to the post-September 2009 time period, where at least one analyst issues a forecast within
the six-day window following the earnings announcement. The sample includes 3,537 unique NYSE-, Amex-,
and Nasdaq-listed firms. Standard errors are clustered by firm and calendar year-quarter. T-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The Kleibergen-
Paap Wald F -statistics for weak instruments and the Kleibergen-Paap χ2 statistics for under-identification
are provided for the first stage specification of IV.
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Internet Appendix
Could a Sophisticated Investor Profit from Street Earnings Activa-
tion Delay?
The results in Section 4 are consistent with a delayed market response to earnings news
for announcements with longer street earnings activation delay. This suggests that investors
with the ability to process earnings news more quickly than FDPs may be able to profit from
this delayed market response. Given that the median activation delay in our post-2009Q3
subsample is 23 minutes, potential arbitrage opportunities are likely short-lived. Therefore,
we use intraday pricing data to examine whether a hypothetical investor could profit from
street earnings activation delay. We estimate the trading profits to an implementable trading
strategy in which an investor enters a position during the first 15 trading-minutes following
an earnings press release and closes the position after one trading-day.37
Specifically, we examine whether the profits to buying (selling) good (bad) earnings
news vary with expected street earnings activation delay. We posit that the profits to
trading on earnings news should be larger when street earnings activation takes longer.
Intuitively, to the extent that earnings news is impounded in price less quickly following
announcements with longer activation delays, investors with a timing advantage can profit
by trading at advantageous prices before earnings news is fully impounded by the market.
Furthermore, our results from Section 3 suggest that investors can use our model of street
earnings activation delay in Eq. (1) to identify press releases with longer expected activation
delay, allowing them to invest in stocks with longer expected activation delay before activation
occurs.38
Accordingly, each quarter we sort earnings press releases into earnings news and ex-
37The trading strategy we examine is implementable for sophisticated investors who have the ability to
quickly process and trade on earnings news. Our analysis relies solely on information available at the time
of the press release. However, some commercially available data used in our analysis would need to be
purchased by an investor wishing to implement our strategy. Similar results could likely be obtained using
only publicly available information.
38We discussed our study with a director at a large brokerage house who was aware of hedge funds that
already engage in trading strategies based on predicting FDP street earnings activation delay.
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pected delay quintiles using cutoff points from the prior four quarters. We estimate expected
delay using rolling regressions of Eq. (1), excluding Post and its interaction term, such that
expected delay is computed by multiplying the independent variables for a given press release
with the coefficients from the pooled regression estimated using the previous four quarters
of data.39 We predict that the hedge return to buying (selling) the highest (lowest) earnings
news (i.e., Surprise) quintile will be greater for earnings announcements in the highest (i.e.,
longest) expected delay quintile relative to the lowest (i.e., shortest) expected delay quintile.
To control for transactions costs, we follow Green (2006) and use volume-weighted
average transactions prices (VWAP) to determine the opening and closing price for each
trading position.40 Positions are assumed to be entered into at the VWAP during the
first 15 minutes after an earnings press release and unwound at the VWAP during the last
two hours of the one trading-day holding period (Green, 2006). Trading minutes include
extended-hours trading.41 To provide estimates that are more relevant to the current data
activation environment, we limit the estimation sample to press releases with announcement
dates after the 2009 I/B/E/S methodology change.42
Table IA.1 presents the estimated profits for each portfolio, stated as mean percentage
returns. Differences in returns between the good and bad news Surprise quintiles (Good-
Bad) are presented for all observations (All), those in the lowest and highest expected delay
quintiles, and a hedge (High-Low) portfolio. t-statistics in parenthesis below each return
difference are calculated based on standard errors clustered by firm and event date. Uncon-
ditionally, the estimated one-day return to the hedge strategy of buying (selling) good (bad)
earnings news is 5.418% (t-stat=20.44). In comparison, the same strategy is estimated to
yield 6.831% (t-stat=10.39) and 4.319% (t-stat=7.52) for press releases in the highest and
39Similarly, the resulting expected delay is sorted into its corresponding quintile based on the distribution
of in-sample predicted values from the pooled regression.
40In contrast to prices from quoted spreads, VWAP take into account the price impact of trading. Green
(2006) notes that the price impact of trading is the primary relevant transaction cost for institutional traders.
41For example, purchases following a 4:00PM earnings announcement are assumed to occur at the extended
hours VWAP from 4:00 – 4:15PM and to be unwound at the VWAP between 2:00PM – 4:00PM the following
trading day.
42Inferences remain unchanged if we include observations prior to September 30, 2009 (untabulated).
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lowest expected delay quintiles, respectively. The difference in returns of 2.512% is econom-
ically meaningful and statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat=2.91). These results
suggest that our model of expected activation delay (Eq.1) is useful to investors, and more
generally, that investors can profit from incorporating expected activation delay in their
trading response to earnings news.
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Table IA.1: Estimated Trading Profits
Surprise
Expected Delay
All Low Delay High Delay High - Low
Bad News -3.314% -2.607% -3.639% -1.032%∗
[2,488] [308] [551] (-1.65)
Good News 2.103% 1.712% 3.192% 1.480%∗∗
[3,088] [649] [454] (2.54)
Good - Bad 5.418%∗∗∗ 4.319%∗∗∗ 6.831%∗∗∗ 2.512%∗∗∗
(20.44) (7.52) (10.39) (2.91)
This table reports equal-weighted average returns to portfolios that go long (short) in good (bad) news stocks
over a one trading-day (960 trading minute) holding period. Each quarter, earnings announcements are inde-
pendently sorted into earnings news and expected delay quintiles using cutoff points from historical data for
the prior four quarters. Earnings news refers to Surprise (as defined in Appendix A.1) and expected delay is
calculated from rolling regressions of Eq. (1), excluding Post and its interaction term. Positions are assumed to
be entered into at the volume-weighted average price during the first 15 minutes after an earnings press release
announcement and unwound at the volume-weighted average price during the last two hours of the holding
period (Green, 2006). Trading minutes include extended-hours trading, following the TAQ data collection pro-
cedure described in Table 5. The estimation sample includes 14,893 quarterly earnings announcements from
the full sample with announcement dates after September 30, 2009, with at least one trade occurring during
the first 15 trading minutes of the holding period and at least one trade occurring during the final two hours
of the holding period. t-statistics in parenthesis below each difference are calculated based on standard errors
clustered by firm and event date.
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